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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
EBBA E. FINLAYSON and ALLAN 
FINLAYSON, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
KENNETH BRADY and DONALD 
B. .MILNE, partners doing business 
as Brady-Milne Appliance Company, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 7713 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
This suit was brought by the appellants, Ebba E. Finlayson 
and Allan Finlayson, husband and wife, against the respondents, 
Kenneth Brady and Donald B. Milne, partners doing business 
as Brady-lvlilne Appliance Company, to recover the purchase 
price of four gas space heaters purchased by the appellants 
from the respondents, for breach of warranty, and for additional 
damages for loss of rentals during October, November and 
December, 1949, in the apartment house of the appellants 
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where the heaters were installed. The respondents filed an 
answer and counterclaim for the balance claimed to be due and 
owing on the purchase price of the heaters but prior to doing 
so, brought a separate suit (R. 52-61) upon the same theory 
and for restoration of the porperty under a Writ of Replevin 
(R. 65). The appellants in turn filed their answer and counter-
claim (R. 76-80) and at the pre-trial hearing, the court ordered 
the two cases consolidated for trial (R. 22-25). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the summer of 1948, the appellants were in the process 
of constructing an apartment building situated at 466 Lindell 
Lane in Sandy City, Utah (R. 115a). The building was a 
fourplex, consisting of three four-room apartments and one 
three-room apartment (R. 115a). Each apartment was de-
signed to ~e heated with a separate gas space heater (R. 116). 
Apartment No. 1 was located on the ground .floor, west side 
of the building, apartment No. 2 on the ground .floor east, 
apartment No. 3 in the basement under No. 2, and apartment 
No.4 was likewise in the basement, under No. 1 (R. 144-145). 
Two separate .flue chimneys were constructed in the building, 
one on the East side to provide vents for apartments 2 and 
3, and the other on the West side to vent the heating units in 
apartments 1 and 4 (R. 121, 122, and 123). 
One of the appellants, Mr. Finlayson, had known the 
respondents for many years and first talked with one of them, 
Mr. Milne, during the summer of 1948, and several times there-
after, regarding the purchase of the gas space heaters which 
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is the subject matter of the controversy herein involved (R. 
117, 152 and 153). At that time a gas application had been 
made to the gas company and Finlayson was in the process 
of securing a right of way for the installation of the gas line 
to his apartment building (R. 117 and 119). Mr. Milne took 
the appellants and their son to his place of business at Murray, 
Utah, and showed them the heaters they were selling. Mr. 
Finlayson recalls that these heaters were a Crosley brand, but 
there is a conflict in the testimony on this point (R. 118, 119 
and 202). About December 6, 1948, a written contract was 
signed by Mrs. Finlayson, and Mr. Milne on behalf of the 
appliance company. It was not dated as the gas was not yet 
available in the Finlayson apartment building (R. 118, 119 
and 12o-Plaintiff's Exhibit A). This contract covered the 
purchase of four refrigerators, four cooking ranges, one wash-
ing machine, one water heater, and the four gas space heaters. 
The ~urn of $340.00 was paid in cash and that amount indicated 
as the down payment (R. 121-Plaintiff's Exhibit A). Some 
three weeks later, another contract was signed by Mrs. Finlay-
son, and the appliance company, this time by Kenneth Brady 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit B). The evidence is in conflict as to 
whether this second contract was dated when signed. Mr. 
Finlayson testified that it wasn't to be dated until the gas was 
put in the premises and they were ready for occupancy (R. 121). 
The same cash down payment was reflected in the second 
contract, with a time balance of $1475.65 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
B). Thereafter, the appellants made two payments, one for 
$150.00 on January 17, 1949, and one on March 3, 1949, for 
$140.00 (Plaintiffs' Exhibits C and D). Additional payments 
in the total sum of $983.50 were thereafter made on the con-
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tract which had been assigned to the Sandy City Bank (R. 
125, 126 and 127), leaving a balance on the contract of 
$202.15 (R. 143). 
The respondents, as the sellers of the gas heaters, agreed 
to install the same, one in each apartment, as part of their 
contract (R. 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 156, 157, 260, 
261 and 289). This was done prior to the time the apartment 
building was completed and the first time there was occasion 
to use the heaters was in September, 1949 (R. 128). The 
heaters leaked gas and all of the tenants moved because it was 
impossible to have the heaters in operation due to their defective 
condition (R. 128 and 129). In response to complaints by 
Mr. Finlayson, the respondents removed the heaters in No-
vember, 1949, and had the collars inside of them welded to 
alleviate the escaping gas (R. 129, 130, 250, 309 and ~~to­
Plaintiffs' Exhibit E). As a result of this unsatisfactory situa-
tion, the appellants lost rentals in their apartment building 
as follows: apartment No. 1, $130.00; apartment No. 2, 
$130.00; apartment No. 3, $70.00; and apartment No. 4, 
$~95.00. These losses, in the aggregate of $525.00, were for 
the months of October, November and December, 1949 (R. 
130, 131, 132, 158, 159, 160, 161 and 162). No claim is 
made for losses occurring after December 31, 1949, as the 
apartment building was sold on contract to Edwin H. Anderson 
and Emma Anderson effective January 1, 1950 (R. 164 and 
302). However, title was not to pass from the appellants 
until payment of the contract in full, at which time a deed was 
to be given. 
After the collars on the heaters had been welded, they 
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still continued to spill gas into the apartments and the gas 
company made numerous. calls to the premises in an effort to 
correct the situation. One tenant testified that she called the 
gas company about fifteen times and that she experienced 
severe headaches (R. 178, 179, 180 and 181). The other three 
tenants likewise experienced trouble with these heaters and 
finally in the latter part of October, 1950, the gas company 
condemned them and capped off the gas supply, so the tenants 
were without heat (R. 180, 181, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190 and 
192). It was then determined that the diverters inside the 
heaters were so designed that they permitted spillage of the 
burned products of combustion back into the room rather than 
diverting the fumes into the vent (R. 192, 193, 194, 198, 199, 
280 and 281). The gas company recommended that the 
baffles on the diverters in each heater be modified to eliminate 
the spillage of gas fumes (R. 192, 193, 194, and 195-Plain-
ti.ffs' Exhibit G). Mr. Finlayson called the Sandy Bank and 
informed them that no further payments would be made on 
the contract unless the heaters were replaced (R. 135, 1=6, 
142 and 143). The heaters were again removed from the 
premises, taken to the gas company's laboratory, and the divert-
ers changed as recommended (R. 213, 214, 215 and 281). 
After the heaters were returned to the apartments, it was 
apparent that the two upstairs ones were still spilling fumes, 
so the flue vents were raised by the respondents (R. 283 and 
291). In January, 1951, the heater in apartment No. 4 
exploded (R. 174, 175 and 176). This was apparently from 
the malfunctioning of the orifice in the heater causing it to 
clog, due to excessive corrosion (R. 177, 200 and 201-De-
fendants' Exhibit 10). 
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At the conclusion of the trial the court directed a verdict 
of no cause of action on the plaintiffs' complaint and further 
directed that judgment be entered in the sum of $491.75 in 
favor of the defendants and respondents, and for costs and 
attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The plaintiffs filed this appeal, and have designated and 
included the entire record and all the proceedings and evidence 
in the action, and in their appeal rely upon the following 
points: 
1. That the court below erred in directing a verdict in 
favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs. 
2. That the court below erred in awarding attorney's fees 
to the defendants where there was no breach of contract by 
the plaintiffs. 
3. That the court below erred in denying plaintiffs' motion 
for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The trial court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed 
in their burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that there existed any breach of warranty insofar as 
the heaters were concerned. It is difficult to follow the trial 
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court's conclusion in this respect particularly in the light of the 
comments made at the conclusion of the trial wherein the 
court said (R. 328): 
"Second, under the contract of purchase was the 
defendant Brady-Milne Appliance Company to make 
installation of the equipment described in the com-
plaint? 
Well, there isn't any question they were to make that 
installation, and they did make that installation. 
·'The third question, was the installation of the said 
equipment. properly made so as to avoid gas leaks; 
I don't think there is any question that there was a gas 
leak in there; no question in my mind but what the 
installation there wasn't proper." 
"Fourth, was the property described in plaintiff's 
complaint reasonably fit for the purposes and uses for 
which it was intended? I don't think it was. I think 
they had to take it out and do some work on it before 
it would work." 
In view of the foregoing comments, it was overwhelm-
ingly apparent from the evidence that there had been a breach 
of contract on the part of the defendants both as to the instal-
lation of the heaters and the implied warranty as to their fitness 
for the particular purpose for which they were required. We 
submit that the case should have been submitted to the jury 
under proper instructions from the court and that they as triers 
of the facts, were entitled to determine the rights of the plain-
iffs in the light of all of the evidence. We contend that the 
jury could have found that there was certainly a breach of 
contract on the part of the defendants for the reasons above 
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stated, and that by such breach of contract, the defendants could 
not recover the purchase price of the heaters. 
Under our system of jury trials it is the province of the 
jury and not the court to determine all questions of fact and 
to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses as they appear 
before them and testify. The court determines and decides 
q~estions of law and directs its application to the facts, but the 
jury is to determine the disputed facts of the case from the 
evidence adduced, in accordance with the instructions given by 
the court. 53 American Jurisprudence, Para. 293, page 248. 
Likewise, a cause should never be withdrawn from the 
jury unless it appears, as a matter of law, that a recovery cannot 
be had upon any view of the facts which the evidence reasonably 
tends to establish. If there is conflicting evidence, and any 
view that the jury might lawfully take of it will sustain their 
findings for either party, the facts should not be withdrawn 
from them. 53 American Jurisprudence, Para. 299, page 251. 
Applying these principles to the instant case and viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we 
respectfully submit that the plaintiffs sustained their burden of 
proof in making a prima facie case and that the trial court 
erred in directing a verdict in favor of the defendants. 
Passing now to the question of warranties in the law of 
Sales as applied to the heaters sold by the . defendants to the 
plaintiffs, this court has recently considered such a proposition 
in the case of Carver vs. Denn, 214 Pac. 2d 118, decided January 
31, 1950. In that case the plaintiff brought suit for the pur-
chase price of air conditioning equipment installed in the 
defendant's place of business; the defendant pleaded a breach 
10 
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of warranty as to fitness in defense. This court in sustaining 
the trial court's judgment in favor of the defendant said: 
"It is apparent from the facts in this case that the 
respondent was primarily interested in air-conditioning 
his place of business, rather than in purchasing any 
specific chattel. The plaintiff was aware that defendant 
knew nothing about air-cooling equipment and he was 
also aware of the fact that the principal object of the 
negotiations and subsequent sale was to provide a 
suitable cooling system for defendant's jewelry store 
. . . The implied warranty of fitness for the particular 
purpose is not negatived by the seller's use of a brand 
name when it is used merely for convenience in identify-
ing the equipment to be installed." 
The court's attention is respectfully invited to Hales-
Mullaly, Inc. vs. Cannon (Okla. 1941) 119 Pac. 2d 46. In 
this case plaintiff filed suit in replevin for recovery of an 
office air conditioner sold to defendant, who was a doctor. The 
defendant counterclaimed setting up a breach of an implied 
warranty and demanded damages for loss of time, fees and 
patients due to plaintiff's mechanics working on the units in 
defendant's office. The jury awarded a verdict in favor of the 
defendant and plaintiff appealed. The court held that the 
evidence as to the breach of the implied warranty was suffi-
cient to submit to the jury the question as to whether the 
machine was unfit for the purpose for which defendant pur-
chased it, and said: 
"It was incumbent upon plaintiff, by whom the 
machine was installed, and to whom the place where 
and the purpose for which defendant bought it were 
11 
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known, to ascertain, before installing the machine, 
whether it would properly operate upon the electrical 
voltage furnished in such building. This plaintiff did 
not do. Defendant purchased the machine upon reli-
ance upon plaintiffs assurance that it would work 
properly in his office, and keep at least one room cool. 
Therefore the implied warranty was for the particular 
purpose. It is clear that the machine failed to properly 
function.'' 
Battle Creek Bread Wrapping Machine Co. vs. Para-
mount Baking Co., 88 Utah 67, 39 Pac. 2nd 323. 
Even the fact that an article has a trade-name does not 
11egative an implied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose where it is purchased not necessarily by the name, but 
for a paritcular purpose and supplied for that purpose. 55 
c. J. 757. 
Jones vs. Just, 23 English Ruling Cases 466: 
"Where the manufacturer or dealer contracts to sell 
an article which he manufactures or produces, or in 
which he deals, to be applied to a particular purpose 
so that the buyer necessarily trusts to the judgment or 
skill of the manufacturer or dealer, there is in that 
case an implied term of warranty that the article will 
be reasonably fit for the purpose to which it was to be 
applied." 
Iron Fireman Coal Stoker Co. vs. Brown, 182 Minn. 
399, 2~4 N. W. 685. 
Pierce vs. Crowl, 190 P. 2nd 1003. 
We believe the instant case comes squarely within the 
provisions of sub-section ( 1) of Section 81-1-15 Utah Code An-
notated, 1943, which provides: 
"Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes 
known to the seller the particular purpose for which 
12 
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the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer 
relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he 
is the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an im-
plied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit 
for such purpose.'' 
This court in commenting upon this statute in the Carver 
vs. Denn case, supra, said: 
"The statute throws a partial cloak of protection 
around a buyer who purchases an article for a particular 
purpose when he must rely on the skill or judgment of 
a seller to determine if the article will serve the pur-
pose." 
Greenland Development Corporation vs. Allied Heat-
ing Products Company, Inc., 164 A. L. R. 1312. 
In the case at bar the· defendants undertook to sell to the 
plaintiffs heaters which would be suitable for heating the 
apartments in which they were installed by the defendants. 
The defendants had been in the appliance business for some 
six years (R. 23 7 and 305) . They had sold merchandise to the 
plaintiffs on previous occasions (R. 238). They inspected 
the premises in which the heaters were to be installed and 
undertook the installation (R. 239, 240, 256, 257 and 258). 
The heaters were to be connected to the main chimneys (R. 
258). The plaintiffs relied upon the defendants to furnish 
heaters suitable for the heating of the respective apartments. 
The evidence plainly shows that the heaters were defective 
from the beginning. The defendants endeavored to correct 
the deficiencies by changing the design and also by welding 
the collars inside the heaters. It is apparent that the plain-
tiffs did not receive what they bargained for in the purchase 
13 
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of the equipment and that they were entitled to an offset on 
the contract for the purchase price of the heaters in the sum 
of $336.00 (R. 142 and 143). The jury was also entitled to 
consider evidence of the loss of rentals claimed directly as a 
result of the malfunctioning of the heaters (R. 130, 131 and 
132), as these additional damages flowed naturally from the 
breach of warranty on the part of the defendants. 
POINT II 
It is the contention of the plaintiffs that the trial court 
erred in awarding attorney's fee in the sum of $200.00 to the 
defendants where the~e was no breach of contract by the plain-
tiffs. The basis for such an allowance is contained in the last 
sentence of paragraph 5 of the contract (Plaintiffs' Exhibits A 
and B) . wherein it is provided: 
"Purchaser agrees to pay all costs of collecting any 
amount or enforcing any rights hereunder including 
any expenses incurred, reasonable attorney's fees and 
the cost of the time and services of any employees in 
making collection.'' 
This court's attention is again respectfully invited to the 
comments made by the trial court at the conclusion of the trial 
wherein the court said (R. 328) : 
"Did the plaintiffs breach the contract of purchase 
by failing to pay the amounts required to be paid by 
the contract? Well, I don't think enough so to let 
this thing go just on that point. I think there was some 
reason for his not paying, that this matter wasn't work-
14 
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ing right, and he had a right to get it working properly 
before he paid his money.·' 
It must be remembered that the plaintiffs initiated action 
against the defendants after they had exhausted all patience 
with the manner in which the heaters had functioned. Then 
for some unknown reason the defendants not alone filed an 
answer and counterclaim to the plaintiffs' complaint, but filed 
another distinct and separate suit themselves as party plain-
tiffs. From the foregoing comments of the trial court, it is 
obvious that the record was devoid of any evidence which 
would justify even the jury finding that the plaintiffs had "in 
any way caused a breach of contract by their mere refusal to 
continue making payments when the heaters purchased were 
so obviously defective. However, at best it was a question of 
fact that should have been submitted to the jury under proper 
instructions from the trial court. At the risk of appearing 
repetitious, we invite the court's attention to the testimony 
of Owen Despain, assistant cashier of the Sandy City Bank, 
who appeared for the plaintiffs (R. 225 to 23 7). He asserted 
that the only periods during which the plaintiffs were delinquent 
in their payments under the contract were when they had been 
granted a deferment in the Spring of 1949 (R. 226) or when 
they refused to pay by reason of their dissatisfaction with the 
equipment that had been delivered, and the manner of installa-
tion (R. 227, 234 and 235-Plaintiffs' Exhibits E and F). 
This the plaintiffs had a right to do in view of the defective 
heaters and the efforts on their part to exert the defendants to 
exchange them for ones that would be reasonably suitable for 
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In the light of the evidence, we respectfully conclude that 
the trial court was in error in entering judgment on the con-
tract and in awarding attorney's fees to the defendants. 
POINT III 
Even though this was a trial by jury, the trial court signed 
and filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
Judgment, the same having been submitted by defendants' 
counsel (R. 41 and 45). The plaintiffs' motion for a new 
trial came on for hearing and at that time objection was made 
by plaintiffs' counsel to the Findings and Judgment which 
had been filed. The trial court ordered the same withdrawn 
and directed that a Judgment on Verdict be substituted (R. 49). 
The Verdict and Judgment on Verdict were then prepared 
and signed, nunc pro tunc, the clerk of the court merely signing 
the jury foreman's name as follows: "Meldo F. Dixon, Fore-
man, by Richard C. Diblee" (R. 46 and 47.) This we believe 
to be an abuse of the court's discretionary power as certainly 
there was no statutory right to direct that the jury foreman's 
name be signed by other than the jury foreman himself. 
We believe this situation to be governed by the provisions 
of Title 104-30-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which provides: 
"When trial by jury has been had judgment must 
be entered by the clerk in conformity to the verdict, 
within twenty-four hours after the rendition of the 
verdict, unless the court orders the cause to be reserved 
for argument or further consideration, or grants a stay 
of proceedings. Other judgments must be entered im-
16 
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;. mediately after the order therefor or the filing of the decision of the court." 
In the instant case, the statute above quoted required that the 
verdict be signed by the jury foreman and the court was afforded 
no discretionary power to order the judgment entered. The 
statute required that the clerk enter the judgment in conformity 
with the verdict and as this procedure was not followed, the 
judgment was a nullity. 
As was said by this court in the case of Ellinwood vs. 
Bennion, 73 Utah 563, 276 Pac. 159: 
"When trial is had by jury, the judge or court does 
not render or sign a judgment, but judgment must be 
entered by the clerk in conformity to the verdict." 
Accordingly, it is respectfully urged that the judgment 
so entered was void and a new trial should have been granted 
on this point alone. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that each of the points of error 
is well taken and should be sustained, that the decision of the 
trial court was erroneous and should be reversed, and judgment 
entered for the plaintiffs upon their complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
F. ROBERT BAYLE, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs and Appellants 
17 
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